Abstract. Based on a novel dataset, the 'German Management and Organizational Practices' (GMOP) Survey, we calculate establishment-specific management scores following Bloom and van Reenen as indicators of management quality. We find substantial heterogeneity in management practices across establishments in Germany, with small establishments having lower scores than large establishments on average. We show a robust positive and economically important association between the management score and establishment level productivity in Germany. This association increases with establishment size. Comparison to a similar survey in the United States indicates that the average management score is lower in Germany than in the United States. Overall, our results point toward lower management quality being at least in part to blame for the differences in aggregate productivity between Germany and the United States.
INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the 21st century an innovative and growing strand of economic research has been focusing on the role of management practices in terms of monitoring, incentivizing and promoting workers in order to explain productivity differences across establishments and countries (Bloom and van Reenen, 2010) . Using data from the World Management Survey (WMS) 1 , a survey with open ended questions conducted in several countries all over the world, Bloom and van Reenen (2007) provide evidence for a positive link between management and establishment performance. Bender et al. (2016) using similar WMS data for Germany also show such a positive relationship. However, these surveys only include a small number of establishments per country, for example around 700 for the United States and around 300 for Germany. Hence, systematic and comprehensive measurements of management practices and assessments of the relationship between management and establishment performance are still in their infancy and this deficit stems among others from the lack of large-scale data on management practices.
Based on the WMS questionnaire, in 2010 the US Census Bureau carried out the 'Management and Organizational Practices Survey' (MOPS). The data include information on over 30 000 manufacturing establishments in the United States and provide information on management practices and establishment characteristics for the years 2005 and 2010. The survey is reported on in Bloom et al. (2013a) . 2 Results from this data show that management practices have become more structured, in the sense of involving more data collection and analysis (e.g. for production targets or bonus payments). Furthermore, a strong positive correlation between the measured management quality and establishment performance was observed (Bloom et al., 2013a) .
We built on this research and conducted a similar survey among establishments in Germany, the 'German Management and Organizational Practices' (GMOP) Survey. The main structure of the survey is based on MOPS, which allows a direct comparison with the findings for the United States. As in the United States, the GMOP interviews were conducted in a large number of establishments and provide information on management practices and establishment characteristics. We collected information on over 1,900 establishments across German manufacturing industries for the years 2008 and 2013. Compared to the WMS, MOPS and GMOP only include closed ended questions.
In this paper, we introduce the novel GMOP dataset and analyze the extent and dissemination of management practices in Germany. Adopting the methodology used by Bloom et al. (2013a) to calculate an index of management quality that is comparable across establishments, we show that there is substantial heterogeneity in this score across establishments. This indicates widespread differences in management practices within Germany. We attempt to explain the observed heterogeneity in management quality using observable establishment characteristics relating to earlier work by van Reenen (2007, 2010) . Furthermore, we investigate the link between management and labor productivity and find that the management score is positively and robustly related to labor productivity. Our estimation results suggest that a one standard-deviation change in the management index is associated with an increase in labor productivity by 11.3%. While this is non-negligible, the effect is lower than for the United States, where Bloom et al. (2013a) calculate an increase by 21.3%, about twice the rate for Germany.
This may have implications for explaining differences in aggregate productivity across countries. As shown in OECD (2015) , aggregate labor productivity growth in Germany has lagged substantially behind the United States for the last two decades. Our results suggest that less structured management in Germany may at least partly explain these productivity differences between the United States and Germany.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section two presents the data and the construction of the management score, and provides evidence on the quite confident that our data are representative of the target population in terms of the establishment's other core characteristics. Broszeit and Laible (2017) investigate whether the survey data are representative by comparing participating establishments and the entire target population using administrative information on the number of employees, the share of female employees, the qualification structure, mean age of employees and median wage, as well as the employment development (cf. Table 3 in Broszeit and Laible (2017) ). They find few differences between participating establishments and the total population, for example for the number of qualified employees and the number of overall employees. However, these differences are small and almost disappear when applying the sample weights. As response rates were randomly distributed for most establishment characteristics, we are confident that selection into survey response did not depend on an establishment's management quality. Overall, we therefore believe that unit non-response is unlikely to affect our results and consider the data to be representative.
How management can be measured -Constructing the management score
The questionnaire asks about 16 management practices, which can broadly be classified into two groups, (i) targets and incentives (I&T) and (ii) data-driven performance monitoring (DDPM). The term targets refers to the communication of production targets to managers and non-managers, the time frame of targets, as well as to the degree of effort that is required to achieve production targets. Incentives measure the use of performance bonuses, promotions and the dealing with underperforming employees. Data-driven performance monitoring refers to the recording and reviewing of key performance indicators, the use of production display boards and to problem-solving in the production process.
The questions are each inquired about for 2008 and 2013. We translated them as accurately as possible from the US MOPS (see Appendix A2 for a comparison of the German and US questions on management practices). When we had to adapt questions to fit the German context, we stayed as close as possible to the original meaning. One example for such an adaption is the question on lay-off practices: As Germany and the United States differ in their institutions, such as 'right to work' in the United States and probation periods in Germany, the question for lay-offs was adapted to exclude probation periods.
As in the US survey, all questions in the GMOP survey have ordinal answer categories, which we later use to score the extent of how 'structured' management practices are. According to Bloom et al. (2013a) structured management practices are defined 'as those that are more specific, formal, frequent or explicit' (Bloom et al., 2013a, p.21) . In this literature, more structure implies higher quality.
The first step in the empirical analysis is to aggregate the available survey information. Adopting the methodology described in Bloom et al. (2013a) , we construct a synthetic management score. This score is a measure of how structured management is at the establishment-level and may as such be interpreted as a measure of management quality. Using the same methodology enables us to compare the German management score directly with the US one. Therefore, as do Bloom et al. (2013a) , we compile the answers from the 16 management questions into one measure reflecting structured management. We only use observations with at least 11 non-missing values in the 16 management items. This threshold was chosen for comparability with the US management score, which was also calculated when at least 11 questions were answered (Bloom et al., 2013a) . 5 Then, the responses to each question are normalized on a 0 to 1 scale with the most structured management practice corresponding to 1 and the least to 0. If questions have more than two categories, the middle categories are assigned shares. For example in the question 'How many key performance indicators were approximately monitored at this establishment'? the least structured answer category would be '1-2 0 and is assigned a '0 0 . The categories in between, that is'3-9 0 and '10-49 0 , are assigned '0.25 0 and '0.75 0 , respectively. The most structured answer category '50 or more' is assigned a '1 0 . To construct the index, each question's answer options are rated according to the aforementioned principles and ordered from best to worst answer option. Finally, we calculate the management score as the unweighted average of the normalized responses.
Thus, the management score lies between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating that the establishment does not use structured practices, and 1 that the establishment uses all management practices in their most structured form. Each management score hence reflects an establishment's choice of particular management practices. The underlying assumption is that more structured management practices employed by an establishment imply better management and hence lead to a higher management indicator. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the management score across establishments in 2008 and 2013. It is evident that there is substantial heterogeneity in this measure across establishments. The mean value of the management score has risen from 0.50 (SD: 0.17) in 2008 to 0.57 (SD: 0.16) in 2013. This means that the average quality of management in German establishments, as measured by the management score, has increased substantially between 2008 and 2013.
One question is whether this increase in the management score may be driven by macroeconomic conditions. Given that we only have 2 years of data, this is unfortunately not an issue we can deal with in detail. However, it is notable that GDP growth rates in 2008 and 2013 were fairly similar at 0.8% and 0.6%, respectively, which does not suggest that economic cycles can explain the development observed in Figure 1 . Furthermore, as we show in Figure 2 , the increase in the management index is primarily driven by a substantial increase in DDPM. This may reflect a trend toward more digitalization in German establishments. 6 We can compare this result with the management scores estimated by Bloom et al. (2013a) for the United States. The average management scores for the United States are 0.52 in 2005 and 0.59 in 2010 (see Figure A1 in the appendix A4). Hence, the measured management quality is higher in the United States than in 5. In robustness checks, we re-estimated Table 3 with alternative definitions of the management score in which we only used observations with 12 or 13 non-missing values, respectively (Note that our sample does not include observations with < 11 non-missing values). This alternative definition of the management score does not change the results. 6. Note that the further econometric analysis below is based on establishment level data, where we control for macroeconomic conditions using time dummies.
Germany, and this difference seems to be roughly constant over the two survey years. 7 This is in line with Bloom and van Reenen (2007) , who use the WMS data and find that US establishments have on average better management than European establishments (France, UK, Germany).
To look in more detail at the management index for Germany, we split up the management score by establishment size. Germany is well known for the importance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the German Mittelstand, which are generally considered as the backbone of the German manufacturing sector (Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, 2013) . In order to relate to this discussion, we depict the variation in the management score across different establishment size classes in 2013 (Figure 3 ). While the German definition of SMEs usually includes establishments with up to 500 employees, the European definition sets the limit at a lower level of 250 employees (European Commission, 2016) . In the graph, we thus define three groups: (i) small establishments with < 50 employees, (ii) medium-sized establishments with 50 to 249 employees and (iii) large establishments with 250 or more employees. 7. Notably, this difference remains in place even though the US survey lags three years behind the German survey (i.e. the years of comparison are 2005 and 2008; and 2010 and 2013) . This means that even measured three years later, management practices are not as commonly used in Germany as in the United States. 8. Note that our sample was drawn from administrative data in 2011 and restricted to establishments with at least 25 employees liable to social security. Since for the surveyed years 2008 and 2013, some establishments indicated values below 25, we name the first category '< 50 employees' instead of '25-49 employees'. The share of establishments with < 25 employees in the surveyed years is around 6%, 1% has < 10 employees. All conducted descriptive and multivariate analyses yield largely similar results with and without these smaller establishments. We thus decided to keep them in the sample and mark single deviations in footnotes.
We see that the management score increases with establishment size and that heterogeneity is a feature of all three size classes. In the left tail of the distributions we observe fewer establishments with low management scores in the largest size class compared to the other two. This is mirrored on the right side with more establishments showing high scores (> 0.8) in the largest size class. This pattern is reflected in the mean values, which are 0.52 (SD: 0.17), 0.59 (SD: 0.14) and 0.68 (SD: 0.12), respectively, for the small, medium and large size categories. These observed differences are statistically significant. In other words: The larger the establishment, the more structured and, in this sense, 'better' is the management on average. Medium-sized establishments are thus doing better than small establishments, but on average lag behind large establishments in terms of their management structure. Bloom et al. (2013a) present a similar finding for the United States. As investments in management are to a large extent fixed costs, it is perhaps not surprising to see evidence for such increasing returns to scale in management. Figure A2 in the appendix A4 combines Figures 2 and 3 and shows changes in I&T and DDPM over the three establishment size categories. As seen above, the overall increase in the management score is predominantly driven by the high increase in DDPM. This applies throughout all size categories and could reflect a common trend of technological upgrading. With an increase from 0.54 in 2008 to 0.69 in 2013, large establishments with 250 or more employees stand out even more. Like in the United States (Brynjolfsson and McElheran, 2016) , small establishments seem to adopt DDPM later, but are well on their way.
What drives the management score?
Having demonstrated that substantial heterogeneity exists in management scores across establishments, the question arises which establishments are most likely to implement structured management practices. van Reenen (2007, 2010) discuss several possible drivers of the management score, either internal or external to the establishment, which we in turn investigate for Germany. First, certain establishment characteristics can drive the management score. For example, Bloom and van Reenen (2010) argue that ownership matters, specifically whether an establishment is family-owned or not. They hypothesize that family ownership could have two opposing effects on management. On the one hand, it may be positive as it potentially reduces the principal-agent problem inherent in establishments with diversified ownership structures. On the other hand, family ownership may reduce the pool of available managers, if these are chosen from within the family. Their findings support these hypotheses in so far as family establishments choosing managers from a large group of family members are no worse than others. However when the top management position is filled by the eldest son by default, establishments' management quality is significantly worse. Bloom and van Reenen (2010) further argue that foreign multinationals have better management practices, due to a selection effect as in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) . Better managed establishments are more able to overcome the sunk costs of investing abroad. Thus, multinationals have on average better management quality.
9 Related to this selection mechanism is the implication that exporters have better management than non-exporters, but that the 'management premium' for exporters is below that of multinationals. Bloom and van Reenen (2010) also show that an establishment's skill intensity is positively correlated with management quality for two reasons. On the one hand, better skilled managers are able to implement more high-quality management practices. On the other hand, implementing high-quality management techniques is easier if the workforce is also skilled, thereby reinforcing the positive effects of management quality.
Second, factors relating to the establishment's environment can also determine management quality. Bloom and van Reenen (2010) argue that fierce product market competition forces establishments to employ the best management practices in order to survive. Accordingly, badly performing establishments drop out of the market (van Reenen, 2011) . Another explaining factor for management score differences are labor market regulations. Stringent regulation may prevent establishments to implement the most efficient management techniques related to hiring, firing or promoting workers and therefore reduce the management score. As opposed to country-or sector-specific regulations, there are establishment level differences in labor market regulations, in particular when it comes to the implementation of works councils. This labor market institution is particularly important in Germany.
Using the GMOP data, the management score is regressed on the variables discussed above. 10 We implement OLS estimations, as we want to provide first evidence on associations in the data, which may then be explored further in future research. Since there are two observations per establishment available, one for 2008 and 2013, we pool the data, include a year dummy for 2008 and cluster the standard errors by establishment. The results are reported in Table 1 . First we look at each establishment level variable individually and then we estimate a full model with all variables included simultaneously.
The regressions show positive and statistically significant coefficients for size as measured by the natural logarithm of the sum of managers and non-managers. Furthermore, there is a positive association between skills of managers (categorical variable that gives the percentage of managers with university degree) and exporting (1 if establishment indicated to export). These findings mirror those for the United States in Bloom et al. (2013a) . Moreover, we find that foreign ownership (1 if establishment is foreign owned) positively correlates with productivity, whereas Bloom et al. (2013a) do not control for this. While the US study also finds a positive relationship between skills of non-managers and productivity, this is not reflected in our study. We also do not find any significant correlation between family ownership 11 , presence of works councils or the level of competition (1 if the establishment reported to face very high levels of competitive pressure) and the 9. While Bloom and van Reenen (2010) only look at foreign multinationals, the GMOP data also includes a variable on whether an establishment has any affiliates abroad -that is we know whether a German establishment is a multinational. We experimented with this variable but did not find any statistically significant association with the management score. 10. For an overview of the variable definitions see Table A3 in the Appendix A3. 11. We cannot control for family management. 
(8)
Size ( 
Source:
Own calculations based on GMOP. management score; these are all variables that are not included by Bloom et al. (2013a) . Note that when looking at each column individually we see that the size variable has the highest explanatory power as judged by the adjusted R-squared. Conditional on industry, year and population-density dummies (in the future: settlement dummies) 12 , variations in the size variable explain about 15% of the variation in management scores across establishments.
MANAGEMENT AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY

Descriptive evidence
We now turn to look at the association between the management score and labor productivity. If management is related to establishment level productivity, then differences in management scores across countries may be able to explain productivity differences across countries as well, as argued by Bloom and van Reenen (2007) .
The underlying assumption concerning this relationship is that management positively affects establishment performance through several channels. First, the management practices that we inquire about in the survey show a certain level of structure in the establishment, which make production and problem-solving processes more efficient and thereby increase productivity. Second, a higher level of employee supervision may lead to more pressure transferred to the employees, but also to a higher motivation level, employee effort and job satisfaction (Nagin et al., 2002) . This in turn increases productivity as well (B€ ockerman and Ilmakunnas, 2012) . Finally, there is a self-sorting process of workers, resulting from the fact that more able and productive workers are hired by better-managed establishments. Bender et al. (2016) provide evidence for such self-selection in German linked employer-employee data. Unfortunately, with our data we are not able to dig deeper into these channels.
To obtain a first idea about the management-productivity relationship, Table 2 presents summary statistics for the baseline regression sample, depicting means and standard deviations for the main establishment level variables. We additionally group establishments into two groups based on their management indicator. Low management includes establishment observations with management scores below or at the median, high management above the median. The last column indicates whether the differences are statistically different. The statistics show that establishments with high management scores are generally larger, have higher shares of managers with university degrees, are more likely to be foreign-owned, to be active abroad (1 if establishment took over a company abroad, set up a location or subsidiary abroad or had an equity participation amounting to a minimum of 10% of foreign companies), have a works council and to export. They also appear to be more productive judging by the mean of labor productivity.
12. Industry dummies are food and consumption, consumer products, industrial goods, investment and durable goods and construction. Settlement dummies capture different population-density levels at the district level. We distinguish larger cities, urban regions, rural regions with signs of densification as well as sparsely populated rural regions.
Baseline specification
In order to investigate this link further we estimate productivity equations of the following form:
where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of labor productivity, calculated as value added per worker. 13 The subscript i indexes the establishment and t the survey year (2008 or 2013) . MS is the management score and F is a vector of establishment level controls. The letters d indicate vectors of dummies for industry, settlement type and survey year and ɛ is the remaining error term. Standard errors are clustered by establishment. To reduce measurement error, the equation also includes a number of paradata and survey-specific variables as noise controls. These are dummies for the survey method (paper-and-pencil or online) and characteristics of the respondent (gender, tenure and position in the Notes: Pooled data. Weighted observations. 'Low management' includes establishment observations with management scores below or at the median, 'high management' above the median. The last column indicates whether the differences are statistically different: **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. D indicates a dummy variable. Source: Own calculations based on GMOP.
13. Labor Productivity = (Sales-Intermediates)/Employees. Note that in our survey we do not have information on the capital stock, which prevents us from calculating TFP. establishment). In order to reduce the impact of outliers, we drop the bottom and top 5% of the productivity distribution.
14 We start by estimating an OLS regression of productivity on the management score without controls. 15 The coefficient reported in column 1 of Table 3 shows that there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between management quality and productivity at the establishment level. The point estimate of 0.69 implies that an increase in the management score by 0.1 points would be associated with an increase in productivity by 7.1%. 16 Recall that the mean of the management score in Germany increased from 0.50 to 0.57 between 2008 and 2013. This change in management quality would be associated with an increase in labor productivity by 4.9% over that period. 17 To put it differently, a one standard-deviation change in the management quality would be associated with an increase in labor productivity by 11.3%. 18 For the United States, Bloom et al. (2013a) calculate an increase by 21.3%, about twice the rate for Germany.
The result indicates that the United States better leverages management practices compared to Germany. This observation may partly be due to a lower number of management practices used in Germany. Descriptive evidence shows that Germany and the United States have similar overall scores for the component 'incentives and targets', however, Germany lags behind in terms of 'data-driven performance monitoring' (see Figure A1 in the Appendix A4). One explanation for this finding could be that the average establishment size in Germany is smaller compared to the United States 19 and that smaller establishments may not see the need to implement structured monitoring practices. This hypothesis is in line with the results of Table 5 below which clearly indicate that the link between the management score and productivity increases with establishment size.
14. We drop the bottom and top five percent of the distribution, as we suspect measurement errors in the data due to two aspects. First, the respondent may not have answered the questions on sales, employees and inputs with reference to the establishment, but to the company. Second, the item on sales in the survey may have been misleading as we inquired about sales in thousands. To refrain from using observations convoluted by measurement error, we drop them. Generating a dummy variable for outlier values and regressing it on all relevant variables revealed no systematic bias induced by the dropping. Table A1 in the appendix provides evidence for the representativeness of the regression sample. We also compared the GMOP productivity distribution to the productivity distribution in the IAB establishment panel, a yearly large-scale representative survey in over 15,000 German establishments. The comparison showed that there are strong outliers both in the bottom and top end of the distribution. Dropping the bottom and top five percent turned out to be necessary for the distributions to align. 15. In order to investigate possible heterogeneity in the distribution of the dependent variable, we re-estimate Table 3 using quantile regression techniques. As the coefficients across the quantiles are not statistically significantly different from each other and do not vary extensively in size, we argue that using pooled OLS regressions is the reasonable choice. 16. exp(0.0689) = 1.071. Bloom et al. (2013a) calculate for the United States that such an increase by 0.1 points in the management score is associated with an increase in labor productivity by 13.6%. 17. exp(0.689*0.07) = 1.049, where 0.07 is the increase in the management score between 2008 and 2013. 18. exp(0.689*0.15) = 1.113, where 0.15 is the sample standard deviation of the German management score (see Table 2 ). 19. The average establishment size in Bloom et al.'s (2013a) analysis is 167 employees with a median of 80. In contrast, the average number of employees in the analyses for Germany is 148 with a median of 70. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Sample standard deviations are provided in Table 2 .
Source:
Own calculations based on GMOP.
In the subsequent columns 2-5 of Table 3 we add more controls in order to make sure that the management score does not merely capture differences in size or other observable characteristics across establishments. 20 While many of the characteristics are statistically significant as expected, they do not change the importance of management for labor productivity. While the magnitudes of the point estimates changes somewhat, they are all around 0.6. Column 6 shows the coefficients of a standard productivity function without including management. The estimation results are comparable with other production estimates in terms of size and significance. Bellmann and H€ ubler (2015) , for example who investigate the relationship between working time accounts and productivity, get similar coefficients for size and qualification structure.
Slicing up the indicator
The management index is based on 16 questions relating to two broad aspects of management, that is incentives and targets (I&T) and data-driven performance management (DDPM). Figure 2 showed differences in the level and growth of these two components. In a next step we therefore aim to explore their separate impact on productivity. In order to do so, we break up the management score into its two components and use these as covariates in the productivity regression.
The results for the split management score, which are reported in Table 4 , clearly show that both I&T and DDPM are positively correlated with labor productivity. The coefficients reported in column 1, where both management indicators are included, are similar in size and significance. This finding indicates that both parts contribute separately to labor productivity and that the management score captures the overall effect adequately.
Taking one more step, we can further split up the indicator into three instead of two components, namely incentives, targets and monitoring. Again we see that each component of the management score contributes separately to labor productivity. 21 Experimental evidence documents a positive effect of performance pay incentives on employee productivity (Lazear, 2000; Bandiera et al., 2005) , as well as a worker selection effect whereby employees with higher productivity sort into establishments which offer relevant incentives (Shaw, 2009 ). Furthermore there is evidence that selection also occurs at the manager-level in so far as managers allocate productive employees to incentivized tasks (Burgess et al., 2010) or predominantly support and select the most productive workers when their own incentives are based on worker performance (Bandiera et al., 2007) . Our results corroborate the generally positive effect of incentives on establishment productivity in a larger sample of establishments. However, when including all three categories together in one regression, the coefficient for targets becomes statistically insignificant. This implies that the coefficient of targets 20. Since good management might be more pronounced in ambitious and leading-edge establishments, we additionally controlled for the implementation of product or process innovations, but did not observe any remarkable changes in the management score coefficient. 21. When we drop establishments with < 25 employees, the coefficient for targets becomes insignificant. 
Differences in establishment size
The descriptive analyses indicate that there is substantial heterogeneity in management scores across size classes (compare Figure 3) . This raises the question as to whether management and productivity have the same relationship in small compared to large establishments. One could argue that even if small establishments were able to implement more structured management practices, they may not be able to reap the benefits from them, because they do not have the capacity in terms of for example workforce, skills or capital to really make a difference. In order to look at this issue we divide the sample into three size categories as before: small (< 50), medium (50-249) and large establishments (≥ 250 employees). The results reported in Table 5 indicate that the correlation between productivity and the management score is by far the highest for large establishments, followed by medium-sized establishments. In fact, we only find a small and weakly significant correlation between management and productivity for small establishments. 22 This suggests that improvements in management structure in small establishments do not lead to large improvements in productivity, which may be due to some internal constraints that prevent management to reap the benefits of management practices. Furthermore, it may also be that small establishments either do not need elaborate management practices due to the small number of employees to be managed or that the implementation and use of management practices relates to large (bureaucratic) costs that may offset the benefits.
Further sample splits
While establishment size is one aspect describing the German Mittelstand, the notion of small and medium-sized establishments in Germany is also related to ownership. As the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (2013) points out, Mittelstand establishments are often establishments that are in family ownership. Recall from Table 1 that family ownership is not directly correlated with the management score, once other covariates are controlled for. However, there may still be implications for the relationship between management and productivity. For example, family-owned establishments may be less efficient in reaping the benefits from new management techniques due to more traditional structures in the establishment which are unlikely to be changed. In order to investigate this, Table 6 reports the results for a sample split into establishments with family ownership and those without (columns 1 and 2).
The split shows that both groups of establishments show a statistically significant and positive association between management quality and labor productivity. The size of the two coefficients is almost identical, indicating that in Germany management practices are equally important in family-owned and non-family-owned establishments.
Another aspect we want to explore is the role of competition. Table 1 suggested that there is no direct correlation between the management score and an establishment's perception of the competition it faces. We assume that the level of competition is important to enable establishments to reap the benefits from newly implemented management techniques. There may be a source of X-inefficiency (Leibenstein, 1966) , if, due to a lack of competition, the establishment is not forced to reap all potential benefits from new management procedures.
To investigate this assumption we split the establishments into two groups, based on their own assessment of the level of competition they face. 23 The estimates in columns 3 and 4 are in line with our conjecture. While both groups of 22. When we drop establishments with < 25 employees, this coefficient becomes insignificant. 23. We define a dummy equal to one if an establishment answers 'very high' to the question about the perceived level of competition it faces. establishments show positive and statistically significant coefficients, the coefficient for establishments experiencing high competition is about double that for establishments in low competitive environments. This result indicates that not all establishments are able to reap the potential benefits from implementing new management practices in the same way; or that establishments in low competition contexts have no need to implement new management practices in the first place, as they do not have to measure up against fierce competition. A Germany-specific institutional setting is the works council through which employees receive a voice in governing an establishment. The works council is tied to a legal code (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) and has substantial rights concerning amongst others hiring and firing, bonuses and working times. In our sample, on average 38% of all establishments in the manufacturing industry have a works council. There is a strong relationship with establishment size shown by the fact that large establishments with 250 or more employees have a works council with a probability of over 80%. 24 In contrast, the share in small establishments with < 50 employees is only 18%. In order to see how the management score is related to this institution, we separately analyze establishments with and without a works council. Following Bellmann and Ellguth (2006) we restrict the sample to establishments with a maximum of 100 employees. In these establishments other forms of worker participation are also possible and the employers face a real decision on the introduction of a works council.
The results, as presented in columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 , show that the coefficient on the management score is substantially higher in establishments with a works council 25 , indicating that establishments with works councils seem to benefit more from the enforcement of good management practices. In unreported results, we dig deeper into this result by looking at the three components of the management score introduced in Table 4 , that is incentives, targets and monitoring. We find that the results in column 6 are mainly driven by incentives, which is the only component that remains significant in the analysis with the three separate components of the management score. Considering that incentives regard promotions as well as hiring and firing, for all which the works council has a say according to the German law, the result is not surprising.
EXTENSIONS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Establishment-specific fixed effects
The pooled OLS estimations thus far give us an idea about the contemporaneous relationship between management quality and productivity as both are measured in the same years. There is a concern that unobserved heterogeneity may bias the result, which makes it difficult to infer a causal relationship. Since the introduction of management practices is not random, but driven by optimization decisions, reverse causality is an issue to address. In order to provide a first step 24. Besides establishment size, the existence of a works council is also correlated with industry, establishment age, bargaining coverage, qualification structure and branch plant status (Ellguth and Trinczek, 2016) . 25. When we drop establishments with < 25 employees, the management score coefficient in column (5) becomes insignificant.
toward dealing with this problem, we estimate a fixed effects model as well as a model with lagged covariates. We start with the fixed effects panel estimation. However some caution has to be exercised in the interpretation of the results as only 2 years of data provide limited variation over time. The results of the estimation are reported in Table 7 . As expected, the coefficients for the management score decrease in size compared to the pooled OLS estimations, as fixed effects that may have previously been captured in the management score, are corrected for by the estimation technique. Reassuringly, the coefficient for the management score remains significant and positive.
We then estimate a different variant of the empirical model where productivity is measured in 2013 while all independent variables are measured in 2008. The results, reported in Table 8 , show that the importance of management quality for productivity holds. The coefficient is statistically significant, though slightly lower than the baseline estimates in Table 3 . These results suggest that the higher the management quality is in 2008, the higher is an establishment's productivity in 2013.
In further robustness checks we merge the GMOP data with additional data sources. First we include establishment-specific effects calculated by Card et al. (2013) and then we link the GMOP data to financial data provided by Bureau van Dijk.
CHK establishment fixed effects
Since we have only 2 years of data, the fixed effects estimated in Table 7 are based on limited information. Fortunately, given that the GMOP sampling frame is based on data from the IAB, we are able to combine our data with other data available at the IAB to potentially rectify this shortcoming. In order to control for time invariant unobservable variables, we use the Card, Heining, Kline (CHK) establishment-specific fixed effects as additional regressors in a robustness check. CHK use administrative employee data (Integrated Employment Biographies, IEB) available at the IAB and calculate individual level wage regressions controlling for individual and establishment-specific fixed effects. The latter, which we use in our robustness checks, hence reflect establishment-specific wage premia possibly capturing rent-sharing, an efficiency wage premium or strategic wage posting behavior.
The CHK effects are calculated for different periods, the most recent covering the years [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . In comparison to the previously estimated fixed effects model in Table 7 , the CHK effects include a larger time variance and more information on the establishment, such as the skill structure. We merge these establishment level fixed effects using the plant identifier available in the administrative data and include them as an additional covariate in the baseline regression.
Since German law requires consent to linkage, this merge can only be done for establishments which specifically agreed to their survey data being linked to other data. 26 This requirement reduces the sample size by about one half. Therefore, we first replicate the baseline regressions from Table 3 . Regressions shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 indicate that the results are robust to the change in sample size.
Columns 3 and 4 report the estimations only for the CHK effects without the management score and columns 5 and 6 then include both the CHK fixed effects and the management score. Reassuringly, the results on the management score remain robust in terms of sign, size and statistical significance. This suggests that the findings are unlikely to be driven by establishment-specific unobserved time invariant heterogeneity. In line with other empirical literature the correlation between the fixed effects and productivity is strong and significant (Bender et al., 2016; Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002) . The CHK fixed effects can be interpreted as an establishment-specific wage premium or efficiency wages.
27
In addition, this result mitigates some of the concerns that the management score captures effects other than management practices, such as for example the general quality of the establishment or worker abilities. These quality effects should be captured by the CHK fixed effects so that we assume the coefficients of the management score to reflect the actual management practices.
Additional outcome variables: Bureau van Dijk
Due to the sampling strategy, we are also able to link the GMOP to data from Bureau van Dijk. This commercial data provider specializes in the provision of financial information. BvD mainly sources its information from Creditreform who in turn collect data from the e-Bundesanzeiger, an official information platform of 26. In their report, Broszeit and Laible (2017) provide information on linkage possibilities of GMOP and consent rates. Furthermore, they carry out analyses on linkage consent bias, which turned out to be negligibly small and statistically irrelevant. 27. The literature also argues that the CHK effects could be interpreted amongst others as management practices or management quality (Card et al., 2013; Bloom and van Reenen, 2007) . We control explicitly for management, therefore, we argue that the remaining CHK effect is net of management. The finding that the point estimate of the management score does not differ much between (2) and (6), is in line with this conjecture. 
Source:
Own calculations based on GMOP linked with CHK.
the German government where establishments have to submit their annual reports. This link allows us to analyze the effects of management practices at the company level instead of the establishment level. We can thus use two additional dependent variables as alternatives to labor productivity, namely, operating revenue per employee and sales per employee. Furthermore, the BvD data provide a measure of capital, which can be included as further control in the regressions.
As with the CHK merge, the link of GMOP and BvD can only be done for establishments who consented to linkage. We further lose observations due to a revised linkage strategy between the BHP and BvD (Antoni et al., 2018) , as well as missing data in BvD. We further have to deal with another data caveat, namely, the fact that we do not have financial data for 2013. Therefore, we can only use the management index for 2008 and cannot estimate a fixed effects model. However, we can estimate separate lagged models for 2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively. The results can be found in Table 10 . 28 The results point to a robust positive relationship between management quality and the investigated outcome variables. Although the models are considerably reduced in the number of observations, the magnitude and significance of the management score remains very close, albeit a bit smaller, compared to the coefficients in the baseline model in Table 3 . This is even more reassuring, as we are now able to include capital in the productivity equations. Table A4 of the Appendix A5 shows additional results when capital is not included in the BvD estimations. For these estimations the number of observations increases due to missing data in the capital variable; the main observed pattern of Table 10 remains the same, however, giving further indication for robustness. Moreover, a pattern emerges, where increasing lags lead to larger management score coefficients, both for operating revenue and sales as dependent variables. It seems that having a good management structure in 2008 leads to an increasingly higher company performance in subsequent years.
Alternative definition of the management score
To test the robustness of the focus variable, we re-calculate the management score in an alternative way. This alternative definition of the management score follows the double standardization approach of Bresnahan et al. (2002) . Thereby we first assign values for the response categories of each item as we did for the original management score, such that we again obtain answer categories in the interval [0, 1] . Then, each management practice was standardized as follows:
where SD is the standard deviation and MP the management practice. The resulting standardized management practices are then added up and standardized a second time:
28. Due to the small number of remaining observations as well as the consolidation at the company level, the representativeness of the BvD sample is not entirely assured. 
Source:
Own calculations based on GMOP linked with BvD.
where DSMS is the doubly standardized management score. Using this new management score definition, we re-estimate Table 3 . The results of this re-estimation are shown in Table 11 . The doubly standardized management score remains robustly positive and significant across all models. Additionally, it also remains robust with regards to effect size: Recall that in Table 3 we had calculated that a one-standard deviation increase in the management score is associated with a 11.3% increase in labor productivity. Using the double standardization approach leads to very similar results, such that an increase in the management score of one standard deviation leads to an associated increase in labor productivity of 8.9-11.4%.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The 'German Management and Organizational Practices' (GMOP) Survey presents a new tool for examining the link between management and establishment performance for a large sample of establishments. The survey is closely modeled on the US 'Management and Organizational Practices Survey' (Bloom et al., 2013a) , which allows comparisons between these two countries. This paper introduces the survey and provides first evidence on the dissemination of management practices as well as the link between management and labor productivity in Germany.
As pointed out, the data only provide two observations per establishment. Hence, we do not have a large time series per establishment which would help to sort out causality. Also, given the nature of the management-productivity relationship we investigate, it is difficult to implement instruments in management surveys (see also Bloom et al., 2013a) . Therefore, the evidence should be regarded as the result of initial attempts to determine correlations in a novel dataset, with a number of steps taken to get closer to causal relationships. However, we take confidence from recent field experiments that suggest a causal mechanism between new management practices and increased performance (Bloom et al., 2015; Jackson and Schneider, 2015) . The same relationship is advocated by 'insider econometrics', which additionally assumes that individual management practices on their own may have no effect, but that a bundle of practices does (Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003) . Hence, we cautiously suggest that at least part of the statistical correlations we uncover reflect causation.
The analyses show that the quality of management, measured by a management score, has increased among German establishments between 2008 and 2013, but still lags behind a comparable measure for the United States. We find that there is a positive association between management score and productivity. However, the strength of this statistical association also appears lower in Germany than in the United States. While not providing unequivocally proof, this result suggests that lower management quality in Germany may partly explain the persistent productivity gap between Germany and the United States in the last two decades (e.g. OECD, 2015) . We can only speculate on the reasons for the lower management quality in Germany. It is conceivable that the relatively lower labor market flexibility in Germany prevents or hinders the use of some management practices concerning human resources, for example hiring and firing, 
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promotion or bonuses. Additionally, higher levels of collective bargaining, union coverage and works councils may have similar dampening effects. Regarding the comparability of the management scores between Germany and the US validity tests should be carried out. Although we did the best possible to be as close as possible to the original meaning of the questions, we cannot state with absolute certainty that all items really measure what they are meant to. A detailed comparative study could help to provide clarity. Together with this, a thorough explanation of the cross-country differences and the implications for aggregate productivity remains.
The data show considerable heterogeneity across establishments in terms of management practices. In particular, we find that establishment size matters. In line with the international literature (e.g. Bloom et al., 2013a) , the management score is substantially higher for large establishments compared to small establishments on average. Additionally, the link between management and productivity is stronger for the former. On the one hand, differences in management scores between establishment sizes in Germany may be due to a lack of necessity for the surveyed management techniques, that is structured rules can be neglected and decisions are made for individual employees in small establishments, but not in larger ones. On the other hand, the cost of implementing management practices may simply be too high.
In this context it should be pointed out that the powerhouse of the German manufacturing industry is the Mittelstand, that is small and medium sized establishments. Given the comparatively low level of management scores for these types of establishments, there is substantial potential for catching up. Improving management practices among this group of establishments could lead to gains in productivity, even if these may be relatively lower than those reaped by large establishments. This apparent underperformance of small and medium sized establishments may also be part of an explanation for the productivity differences observed between Germany and the United States. It also links to a broader international debate on growing productivity dispersion. Andrews et al. (2015) present suggestive evidence that growth among technologically leading establishments remained robust in recent years, but aggregate productivity in advanced economies, also Germany, has been slowing down. Increasing productivity dispersion could result from insufficient absorptive capacity of lagging establishments to learn from frontier establishments. Future research might therefore explore to what extent management practices, as a form of tacit knowledge of the production process, diffuse too slowly among establishments and whether complementary investment, for example computerized information, can help mitigate this process (OECD, 2015) .
Having documented relevant evidence for long-term productivity premia in German establishments when structured management practices are present, we suggest that our results entail important policy implications. Policy initiatives should provide best practices for establishments on management practices and should facilitate the dissemination of good management practices among establishments to overcome questions as to which practices to implement and how to lower implementation costs. Because it is unrealistic to expect governments to target a large number of individual establishments, the G20 advocate to implement good management in a limited number of establishments and then use these for demonstration effects (G20 Employment Working Group, 2016). Experimental evidence suggests that such a consultation leads to more structured management practices, as well as higher establishment performance (Bloom et al., 2013b) .
Given the importance of small and medium sized establishments in Germany's manufacturing sector and their comparatively low management scores, it is crucial for these establishments to catch up in terms of better management practices. When resources are scarce, it is therefore important to ensure that interventions are targeted at small and medium sized establishments with high growth potential (G20 Employment Working Group, 2016).
APPENDIX APPENDIX A1. SURVEY DETAILS AND DATA QUALITY
Conduction and survey design
The survey was carried out jointly by two research institutions, the IfW and the IAB and infas, a company highly experienced in running large-scale surveys. The original US MOPS survey format was carried over by conducting all interviews by paper-pencil or online and by keeping to the questionnaire and survey design of the MOPS.
Respondents
We define the target respondent as top manager, that is managing director, CEO, division or plant manager. We believe that this respondent group has the best overview of the establishment's processes and structures and can thus give better information both on the use of management practices and performance measures (Tomaskovic-Devey, Leiter, and Thompson, 1995) . Over 90% of all completed surveys were answered by the target group. 29 The respondents have an average tenure of 17 years and about 80% are male.
29. 65% of the respondents are executive officers, 4% are managers of multiple establishments, 10% managers of one establishment and 11% managers within an establishment. 3% of the respondents were not managers.
Sample design
The GMOP population consists of German establishments in the manufacturing industry with 25 or more employees liable to social security. A disproportional stratified random gross sample design based on sub-industries, establishment sizes and settlement structures was chosen. The sample was drawn from the Employment History Panel (BHP) 2011, which includes all German establishments with at least one employee liable to social security (Gruhl et al., 2012) , with the restriction that a valid link between the BHP and company-level Bureau van Dijk data had to exist (Antoni et al., 2018) . This strategy was chosen to enable joint analysis on the company and establishment level. Further restricting the BHP-BvD population to establishments in the manufacturing industry with more than 25 employees, the target population consists of 54,610 establishments. From these, a gross sample of 32,847 establishments was drawn for the GMOP survey.
Completed surveys and recall bias
The field phase lasted from November 2014 to May 2015 and several reminders were sent to the establishments during this time. In the end, 1,927 complete interviews, covering the years 2008 and 2013 were collected. All answers in the questionnaire were based on recall. An analysis comparing administrative establishment level data from the IAB and the GMOP did indicate that a possible recall bias kept within acceptable limits (Broszeit and Laible, 2017) .
Response rates
The overall response rate is 6%. A comparison of response rates within the stratification variables, size, industry and settlement shows that the participating establishments are spread rather equally across the strata. The main deviations can be observed for small establishments with 25-49 employees, which are slightly underrepresented while the larger establishments are slightly overrepresented. While establishments from 'industrial goods' are overrepresented, those from 'construction' are underrepresented. No notable differences occur regarding the settlement structure.
Survey representativeness
Several analyses indicate that the survey is representative (Broszeit and Laible, 2017) . Comparing participating establishments with all establishments in the target population based on data from the BHP reveals that only small deviations occur, for example concerning the qualification structure. The GMOP establishments have slightly better qualified employees compared to the total population. However, the observed significant differences are very small. Furthermore, no significant differences are observed for the share of females, the share of trainees, the employee age structure or the establishment age. When using sampling weights, which correct for the sample drawing design, the GMOP participants' means quite accurately align to the means of the total population. This indicates that the differences are not severe and that deviations can be accounted for by using weights. We therefore use weights for descriptive statistics and include the stratification variables in our multivariate regressions.
Unit non-response
Unit non-response is investigated in Broszeit and Laible (2017) . They conduct a multivariate selectivity analysis, which shows whether the variables above significantly influence the willingness to take part in the survey. Their estimates do not indicate any serious concerns in terms of systematic bias due to nonresponse. They conclude that, overall, systematic unit non-response is unlikely to affect the estimation results via biases incurred by the lack of participation of some establishments.
Consent to linkage
Explicit permission is a mandatory prerequisite for merging survey data to other (administrative) data in Germany. 53% of the GMOP respondents consented to linkage with data available at the IAB, such that 1,021 establishment observations can be used for joint analysis with other datasets.
Representativeness of the regression sample
As we lose observations due to missing values in single variables and the dropping of productivity outliers, we provide evidence for the representativeness of the regression sample. Given that the sampling design is based on administrative data from the IAB, we have information on several establishment characteristics for the whole target group. We refer the representativeness analyses to the year 2014, the beginning of the survey field phase, in which the target population amounts to 50,624 establishments. Table A1 . Shows both the probability of taking part in the survey (column 1) and of being included in the analytic estimations (column 2). In column 1 the dependent variable takes the value one if the establishment completed the GMOP survey and was found in the BHP 2014 data. This is true for 1,877 establishments. In column 2 the dependent variable is one, if the establishment is in the regression sample, which applies to 932 establishments. Excluded are observations that had to be dropped due to missing values or data cleaning processes.
The estimations show that the share of qualified employees, the share of trainees as well as median wages significantly influence the outcome variables of both columns. However, the estimates are small in size and do not significantly differ between column 1 and 2. We thus regard the regression sample to be unbiased. Further information on the target population as well as evidence for the representativeness of the full data is provided by Broszeit and Laible (2017) . -Possible to achieve without much effort -Possible to achieve with some effort -Possible to achieve with normal amount of effort -Possible to achieve with more than normal effort -Only possible to achieve with extraordinary effort -I do not know -Does not apply; no production targets establishment to achieve its production targets? Check one box for each year. -Possible to achieve without much effort -Possible to achieve with some effort -Possible to achieve with normal amount of effort -Possible to achieve with more than normal effort -Only possible to achieve with extraordinary effort 14. 
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